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Decentralized Provision of Renewable Predictions
within a Virtual Power Plant
Yue Chen, Tongxin Li, Changhong Zhao and Wei Wei
Abstract—The mushrooming of distributed renewable energy
and storage turns end-users from passive price-takers to active
market participants. To manage those massive proactive end-
users efficiently, virtual power plant (VPP) as an innovative
concept emerges. It can provide some necessary information
to help consumers improve their profits and trade with the
electricity market on behalf of them. One important information
that is desired by the consumers is the prediction of renewable
outputs inside this VPP. Presently, most VPPs run in a centralized
manner, which means the VPP predicts the outputs of all the
renewable sources it manages and provides the predictions to
every consumer who buys this information. However, when more
consumers and renewable energy sources participate in the
market, this centralized scheme needs extensive data communica-
tion and may jeopardize the privacy of individual stakeholders.
In this paper, we propose a decentralized prediction provision
algorithm in which consumers from each subregion only buy local
predictions and exchange information with the VPP. Convergence
is proved under a mild condition, and the gap between centralized
and decentralized schemes is proved to have zero expectation and
bounded variance. Illustrative examples validate the proposed
algorithm numerically and show that the variance of the gap
between centralized and decentralized schemes decreases with
more consumers and higher uncertainty.
Index Terms—Decentrailized prediction, local information,
virtual power plant, prediction precision, renewable uncertainty
NOMENCLATURE
A. Indices and Sets
i,I(Il) Index and set of consumers.
l,L Index and set of subregions.
n,N Index and set of generators.
s,Lg Index and set of lines.
Nl Set of consumers buying predictions on renew-
able output in subregion l.
Si Set of predictable subregions for consumer i.
B. Parameters
w,σ2Wl Expectation and variance of Wl .
I,L Number of consumers and subregions.
N,J Number of generators and fixed demand.
cn,dn Cost coefficients of generator n.
u, t Coefficients of consumer’s utility function.
D fj Fixed demand in the electricity market.
pins,pi js,pivs Line flow distribution factors.
Fs Transmission capacity on line s.
α,β0 Coefficients of function indicating the relation-
ship of electricity price and VPP demand, and
we have γ = Iα , ζ = ILα .
m Cost coefficient for certain precision level.
C. Decision Variables
Di Consumption level of consumer i, and Dceni ,D
dis
i
for centralized and decentralized schemes, re-
spectively; D is the average value.
gn Power output of generator n.
Wl Total renewable output in subregion l, a random
variable and wl its realization.
W preil Prediction of Wl for i, and w
pre
il its realization.
λ Electricity price for the virtual power plant.
εil Additive random noise in the prediction W
pre
il ,
and its variance is σ2εil .
τil Prediction precision of consumer i on renewable
output in subregion l; and τcenl ,τ
dis
l for central-
ized and decentralized schemes, respectively.
βl A signal in the decentralized algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE increasing penetration of distributed renewable en-ergy has been considered as a promising solution to
global warming and environmental pollution [1]. Despite the
potential benefits, the volatility and intermittency of renewable
energy also exerts challenges on power system operation [2].
Vast literature has been addressing this issue by stochastic [3],
robust [4], or distributionally robust [5] optimizations. When
it comes to distributed renewables, this problem becomes
more complicated: Their capacities are usually small, so it
is extremely hard for the operator to detect and prepare for
their uncertainty day ahead [6]. Facing these obstacles, the
concept of virtual power plant (VPP) was proposed, whose
initial version was the virtual utility in [7]. Despite the lack of
universally accepted definitions, the essence of VPP is to pro-
mote system flexibility and economics by allowing different
participants to virtually share their resources. A comprehensive
review of VPP can be found in [8].
In recent decades, VPP has captured great attention from
both academia and industry. Basically, there are two ways for
controlling devices and transmitting information within a VPP:
the centralized approach and the decentralized approach [9].
Under the centralized scheme, there is a coordination centre in
charge of all devices and participants. Information collection
and transmission are conducted centrally, and global optimal
strategies are made. The day-ahead optimal scheduling of VPP
with energy storage, electrical and thermal energy resources,
and demand response facilities were studied in [10], and the
point estimate method was used to depict the uncertainties.
The imperialist competitive algorithm was proposed in [11] to
minimize the VPP’s operating cost under renewable output,
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
08
24
3v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  1
5 J
un
 20
20
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. XX, NO. X, FEB. 2019 2
load demand, and market price uncertainties. The trading
of VPP in both energy and reserve electricity markets were
studied in [12] by stochastic adaptive robust optimization. The
optimal automatic frequency restoration reserve for VPP was
analyzed in [13]. The robust capability curve indicating the
allowable range of VPP was characterized in [14].
The centralized scheme can achieve global optimal solu-
tions, but when it comes to large-scale distributed energy
resources (DERs), it may become impracticable due to: 1)
Computational Burden. With an increasing number of DERs,
the centralized scheme entails a tremendous amount of data
acquisition and communication overhead. 2) Privacy. The
DERs are located in different subregions (SRs), owned by
different stakeholders with conflicting economic interests, and
they may be unwilling to provide private data for central
control. Decentralized schemes can overcome these problems.
A fully distributed ADMM-based algorithm for VPP problems
was developed in [15], and an application can be found in the
demand response program of electric vehicles [16]. Distributed
primal-dual sub-gradient algorithm was proposed for coordi-
nating DERs within a VPP via limited communication [17].
Non-ideal communication network was considered in [18]
For both schemes, the gathering, processing and provision
of information is critical as it is the foundation of the VPP
operation. The interface between the VPP and DERs was
designed with an information model in [19] so that the
VPP can make full use of the aggregated flexibility of those
resources. A general architecture as well as the Information
and Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure for VPP
operation were presented in [20]. A case was tested in [21]
regarding the VPP communication system providing manual
frequency restoration reserve service. Above works mainly
focus on the physical construction of the VPP communication
system, but the information to offer, the combination of infor-
mation transmission and control schemes, and the resulting
performance are also important issues that have not been
formally studied. This topic appears to be more important
with the proliferation of distributed renewable energy. The
volatile output of renewable energy intensifies the uncertainty
of electricity market prices, which will greatly influence the
profit of the VPP and its participants [22]. Therefore, the VPP
is desired to provide certain information (prediction) to help
consumers decide their consumption levels. Providing such
information incurs a cost related to information precision and
thus leaves an optimal precision to be determined.
This paper addresses the problem above by proposing a
decentralized uncertainty prediction provision algorithm. The
main contributions are two-fold:
1) Model. A two-level model is proposed to depict con-
sumers’ decision-making under distributed renewable uncer-
tainties. In contrast to previous research, each consumer can
purchase prediction information from the VPP to improve its
knowledge of the uncertain renewable outputs via conditional
expectation. The cost of this prediction information related
to prediction precision is characterized. In the lower level,
real-time electricity price is determined by a market-clearing
problem with volatile renewables. The relationship between
the price and the total demand inside VPP is further depicted
as a piecewise linear curve. In the upper level, each consumer
maximizes its conditional expected utility based on available
predictions, and solves for an optimal prediction precision.
2) Algorithm. A decentralized prediction provision (DPP)
algorithm is presented. The region covered by the VPP is
divided into several SRs, and the consumers inside each SR
can only purchase local predictions of the renewable outputs
in that SR. Meanwhile, it can exchange information with
the VPP. The proposed decentralized scheme can overcome
the drawbacks of centralized schemes such as extensive data
exchange and possible violation of information privacy. We
prove that the DPP algorithm converges under mild conditions,
the performance gap between centralized and decentralized
cases has zero expectation and bounded variance. Simulation
further shows that the variance of this gap decreases with more
consumers and higher uncertainty.
In the rest of this paper, the market model and prob-
lem formulation are presented in Section II; the centralized
benchmark for optimal power consumption is introduced in
Section III; the distributed prediction provision algorithm is
developed and compared with the centralized one in Section
IV; Numerical experiments are reported in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Market model
Consider a VPP participating in the distribution electricity
market. The region covered by this VPP can be roughly
divided into L subregions indexed by l ∈ L := {1, ...,L}
according to the location of distributed renewable sources.
For each SR l, the aggregated volatile renewable output is
uncertain and can be represented as a random variable Wl in
R
+ with unknown distribution. Denote by wl := E(Wl) its
expectation and σ2Wl :=D(Wl) its variance. Each SR consists
of a set of consumers indexed by i ∈ Il := {1, . . . , Il}, and
the set of all consumers inside the VPP is I = ∪Ll=1Il . Every
consumer can adjust its consumption level to maximize its
(expected) net utility, and the demand of consumer i in SR
l is Di, i ∈ Il1. The VPP gathers the demand requirements
from all consumers, which is ∑Ll=1∑i∈Il Di, and purchases
electricity from the distribution power market. It is worth
noting that, in contrast to traditional retailer, the VPP does
not make profit directly from selling electricity but acts as
a coordinator and provide supporting information/prediction.
The market structure is shown in Fig. 1.
For the distribution electricity market, there are N thermal
generators indexed by n∈N = {1, ...,N}. The output of the n-
th generator is gn, and its cost function is fn(gn) = cng2n+dngn,
where cn and dn are non-negative cost coefficients. The cost
of a renewable unit is usually close to zero, and therefore is
neglected here. The market minimizes the total generation cost
in (1a) subject to power balancing constraint (1b), capacity
limits (1c) and network constraints (1d):
min
g1,...,gN
N
∑
n=1
(cng2n+dngn) (1a)
1The consumer’s demand is determined by the consumer’s decision-
making problem (6) and we will give a detailed description in Section II-C.
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Fig. 1. The hierarchical market model considered in this paper.
s.t.
N
∑
n=1
gn+
L
∑
l=1
Wl =
L
∑
l=1
∑
i∈Il
Di+
J
∑
j=1
D fj : λ (1b)
gn ≤ gn ≤ gn,∀n ∈N (1c)∣∣∣ N∑
n=1
pinsgn−
J
∑
j=1
pi jsD fj +pivs
(
L
∑
l=1
Wl−
L
∑
l=1
∑
i∈Il
Di
)∣∣∣
≤ Fs,∀s ∈ Lg (1d)
Here, D fj ,∀ j = 1, ...,J represents the equivalent fixed demand
other than the purchase of VPP in the distribution electricity
market. λ comes from the dual variable of the power balancing
condition (1b), giving the electricity price for the VPP (also
for every consumer inside this VPP).
To facilitate further analysis, we first characterize the
relationship between price λ and the VPP’s total demand
∑Ll=1∑i∈Il Di as a piecewise linear curve, whose particular
segment around the market clearing point is:
λ (D,W ) = α
(
L
∑
l=1
∑
i∈Il
Di−
L
∑
l=1
Wl
)
+β0 (2)
with constant coefficients α > 0, β0.
Remark: (i) Price λ as the Lagrangian multiplier of con-
straint (1b) can be solved from the KKT condition at the
primal-dual optimum of (1). It can be proved under mild
conditions (e.g., at optimum, at least one generator does not
reach its capacity limit and is not causing congestion) that the
dual-optimal λ is unique (for which we skip the proof) and is a
piecewise linear function of
(
∑Ll=1∑i∈Il Di−∑Ll=1Wl
)
[23, p.
95]. Such a piecewise linear structure is also observed in power
market literature, e.g., [24]. (ii) Since one VPP only accounts
for a small fraction of the grid’s total load, it is reasonable
to assume that (1) has a fixed set of binding constraints
at optimum, despite the varying renewable generation and
demand of the VPP. Therefore, λ stays in the same segment
of the piecewise linear curve, whose coefficients α , β0 can be
determined a priori from historical data. (iii) We assume that
the total demand ∑Ll=1∑i∈Il Di is sufficiently higher than the
total renewable output ∑Ll=1Wl , which keeps λ (D,W ) positive.
B. Prediction information of renewable sources
As mentioned above, the renewable outputs W1, . . . ,WL are
random variables, and thus, the electricity price λ (D,W )
is also volatile and uncertain. The VPP may try to offer
prediction of the output of renewable units W1, . . . ,WL to
help consumers enhance their profits. Consumers need to pay
for this information, and Nl is the set of consumers buying
predictions on renewable output in SR l. If consumer i buys
the information for SR l, then it will get a forecast of Wl
from W preil = Wl + εil , where εil is additive random noise.
W preil is also a random variable, and w
pre
il is the actual forecast
consumer i ∈Nl gets. We assume:
A1: Each SR has the same number of identical consumers,
i.e., Il = I for all l = 1, . . . ,L.
A2: {εil : i ∈ Nl} are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.), each εil has zero expectation and is independent
of Wl . Denote by σ2εil the variance of noise εil .
Although different SRs can have different numbers of con-
sumers and the consumers inside each SR may also be het-
erogeneous, we make assumption A1 to derive a theoretically
sound result. In practice, we can adjust the region division so
that every SR has an equal number of consumers as well as a
representative to model all the consumers inside it.
Consumer i utilizes wpreil to improve its knowledge about
Wl . It is well known that conditional expectation E[Wl |W preil =
wpreil ] is the best estimator of Wl [25, p. 346], which, however,
may be a complicated nonlinear function of wpreil if (Wl ,W
pre
il )
is not subject to bivariate normal distribution [26]. Therefore,
in this paper we adopt the best linear estimator of Wl as2
E[Wl |W preil = wpreil ] = A1i,l+A2i,lwpreil
where A1i,l and A2i,l are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 1.
A2i,l =
σ2Wl
σ2Wl +σ
2
εil
, A1i,l = (1−A2i,l)wl (3)
The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Appendix.A, and it
is indeed consistent with known results about the best linear
estimator, e.g., [26]. When σ2εil → ∞, we have E[Wl |W
pre
il =
wpreil ] = wl . It means that the VPP’s forecasting technique
is poor and the prediction wpreil offers no information, so
the consumer simply uses the expected renewable output.
With higher penetration of renewables, forecasting plays an
increasingly important role in enhancing consumers’ profits.
However, improving the precision of the forecasts from VPP
may generate costs, which will be split among the consumers.
To depict this cost, we borrow the concept of prediction
precision in economics [27] defined as follows. with the related
cost given in (5).
Definition 1. (Prediction precision [27]) The coefficient A2i,l
in Lemma 1 is formally defined as prediction precision of
consumer i on renewable output in SR l:
τil :=
σ2Wl
σ2Wl +σ
2
εil
(4)
The smaller σ2εil is, the more accurate the prediction is. The
concept τil given in (4) decreases with σ2εil : when σ
2
εil → 0,
2We still use E to denote the best linear estimator although it can be an
approximate of the actual expectation.
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τil → 1 and we have W preil =Wl which is the most accurate
case; when σ2εil → ∞, τil → 0 and we have W
pre
il ≈ εil which
is the most inaccurate case. τil varies in [0,1] and a larger τil
indicates a higher prediction precision. Improving prediction
technique may incur costs [27], which is paid by all consumers
in Nl and given by
hl(τil) :=
mˇ
σ2Wl
τil
1− τil (5)
where mˇ is the cost coefficient for achieving certain precision
level, and mˇ := m/|Nl |. Denote by τl := ∑i∈Nl τil/|Nl |. The
prediction cost of renewable output in SR l for each consumer
i is related to three factors, the number of consumers buying
this information |Nl |, the prediction accuracy τil , and the level
of renewable uncertainty σ2Wl . The term mˇ decreases with |Nl |,
indicating that with more consumers involved, the cost per
consumer goes down. The term τil/(1−τil) increases with τil ,
meaning that the consumer needs to pay more for a higher
prediction precision. A higher σ2Wl would make it harder to
predict the renewable output accurately so the cost increases.
C. Decision making of consumers
The demand of consumer i is Di, and it pays at the electricity
price λ (D,W ) in (2). The real-time price λ (D,W ) depends
not only on the joint consumption of all consumers, but also
on the realization of random outputs W1, . . . ,WL which is
not known to the consumers. Therefore, consumers need to
predict future renewable outputs for making their decisions.
The consumer can buy these predicitons from the VPP and
we denote by Si the set of predictable subregions whose
predictions are available to the consumer i. In other words,
the i-th consumer knows the predictions {wpreil : l ∈ Si} before
determining Di, the amount of electricity to buy. Define an
event Ai := {W preil = wpreil , l ∈ Si} for all consumers i ∈ I.
The utility function of consumer i is Ui(Di) = −uD2i /2+
tDi where u, t > 0 are constants. The consumer i chooses its
demand level to maximize its net utility, i.e., the utility minus
the electricity purchase cost. Let the conditional expectation
E[λ (D,W )|Ai] be the prediction of price for each consumer
i ∈ I. This leads to the following decision rule of Di, i ∈ I:
max
Di
pii :=Ui(Di)−DiE[λ (D,W )|Ai] (6)
We consider the case where there is such a large number
of consumers in the market that the impact of an individual
consumer’s strategy on the electricity price λ (D,w) is negli-
gible. It means that E[λ (D,w)|Ai] can be treated as a given
constant in problem (6) [28]. Thus, letting the derivative be
zero, the i-th consumer’s decision D∗i satisfies:
t−uD∗i =E[λ (D,W )|Ai] (7)
D. Predictable subregions: centralized vs decentralized
The choice of {D∗i : i ∈ I} will be influenced by the sets of
SRs {Si : i ∈ I} that the consumers can get predictions on. In
the following, we compare two VPP’s information provision
ways: centralized and decentralized. Under the centralized
scheme, each consumer is able to know the predictions of
 
Fig. 2. Centralized (left) versus decentralized (right) prediction provision.
all the SRs from the VPP. Under the decentralized scheme,
each consumer can only get local predictions from the SR it
belongs to but can exchange some information with other SRs
via the VPP. The centralized scheme serves as a benchmark
in our analysis, which is presented in the sequel.
Centralized scheme. Suppose every consumer get predic-
tions of uncertain renewable outputs in all the SRs, as shown
in Fig.2 (left). Therefore, the predictable set Si=L for all i∈I
and Nl = I for all l ∈ L. Specifically, each consumer i ∈ I
has predictions {wpreil : l ∈ L} and expectations {wl : l ∈ L}.
This centralized scheme in Section III serves as a benchmark
for the decentralized scheme in Section IV.
Decentralized scheme. The centralized benchmark above
could be hard to implement because of: 1) Communica-
tion burden. The centralized scheme requires the information
transmission of all SRs to all consumers, which will incurs
huge challenge on the data acquisition and communication
infrastructure. 2) Information privacy. Different SR may want
to keep its data privacy, and are not willing to share all those
information with other SRs. Therefore, we consider a more
practical case where only local predictions are available, as
shown in Fig.2 (right). Specifically, the set of predictable SRs
is Si = {l} for every consumer i ∈ Il . Each consumer i ∈ Il
only has prediction {wpreil } and expectation wl of the subregion
l where it is located.
We next present a centralized model with optimal affine
decision policy based consumers as a benchmark.
III. CENTRALIZED SCHEME WITH AN AFFINE POLICY
In this section, we analyze consumers’ strategies under the
centralized scheme as well as the optimal prediction precision.
In principle, consumers’ strategy can be an arbitrary function
of their predictions. Here, we restrict the scope of this study
to the affine policies, which is commonly used in uncertain
related studies [29], [30]. Specifically, consider the following
strategy of consumer i ∈ I:
Dcen∗i := b1+
L
∑
l=1
bl2i(w
pre
il −wl) (8)
where b1 and {bl2i : i∈I, l ∈L} are constants to be determined.
Note that {εil : i ∈ I} are i.i.d. with E[bl2iεil ] = 0 and assume
variance D(bl2iεil) is uniformly bounded for all i and l.
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Consider a big group Nl of consumers so that the law of
large numbers can be applied to obtain their average demand:
Dcen∗ :=
L
∑
l=1
1
|Nl | ∑i∈Nl
bl2i(w
pre
il −wl)+b1
=
L
∑
l=1
∑i∈Nl b
l
2i
|Nl | (wl−wl)+b1+
L
∑
l=1
∑i∈Nl b
l
2iεil
|Nl |
=b1+
L
∑
l=1
bl2(wl−wl)
where bl2 := ∑i∈Nl b
l
2i/|Nl | = ∑i∈Nl bl2i/(IL). Then, we can
get every consumer’s optimal strategy under given prediction
precision by giving the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Given prediction precision τil ,∀l ∈ L, i ∈ Nl ,
consumer i ∈ I’s optimal demand under centralized manner is
given by (8) with
bl2i =
ατil
ζτl+u
,∀l ∈ L,
b1 =
t−β0+
L
∑
l=1
αwl
ζ +u
(9)
where ζ = ILα .
The proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix.B. It gives
the optimal strategy of a consumer under certain prediction
precision. Together with the optimal condition (7), consumer
i ∈ I’s expected net utility is
E[pii] := E[
1
2
u(Dcen∗i )
2]
=
u
2
( t−β0+α
L
∑
l=1
wl
ζ +u
)2+
L
∑
l=1
α2σ2Wlτil
(ζτl+u)2
 (10)
Note that E[pii] increases with prediction precision τil of
consumer i, but decreases with the average precision τl across
Nl . This aligns with the intuition that a consumer earns more
by having more information about renewables and earns less
if all of its competitors know more information than itself.
The optimal prediction precision of a consumer is given by
Proposition 2, whose proof is deferred to Appendix.C.
Proposition 2. Under the centralized scheme, the optimal
prediction precision for the renewable source in subregion l is
τcen∗l = max
(
0,
σ2Wl −
√
2mu/(IL)/α
σ2Wl +
√
2mIL/u
)
(11)
for every consumer i ∈ I.
Following Proposition 2, we obtain the optimal average
demand over all the consumers in Nl ,∀l ∈ L as:
Dcen∗l = b1+
L
∑
j=1
ατcen∗j
ζτcen∗j +u
(w j−w j) (12)
For renewable uncertainty (variance) σ2Wl so small that τ
cen∗
l =
0, a consumer tends to make decisions just based on expecta-
tion wl . In contrast, as σ2Wl → ∞, a consumer’s best option is
τcen∗l → 1, i.e., to make as accurate prediction as possible.
Algorithm 1: Decentralized Prediction Provision
Input: input parameters cn,dn,∀n ∈N , I, L, ε .
Output: optimal demand Ddis∗il ,∀l ∈ L,∀i ∈ Il .
Initialization: βl = 0,∀l ∈ L, k = 0;
repeat
iteration k++
VPP:
for l = 1; l ≤ L do
consumers in SR l:
for i= 1; i≤ I do
consumer i gets β kl and a predict w
pre
il .
update Dk+1il ,∀i ∈ Il by (14) (16), and
Fk+1il := D
k+1
il −wpreil /I,∀i ∈ Il
end
Fk+1l := ∑i∈Il F
k+1
il
end
update β k+1l by
β k+1l := β0 +α∑
j 6=l
Fk+1j ,∀l ∈ L
until maxl∈L |Fk+1l −Fkl | ≤ ε;
IV. DECENTRALIZED SCHEME WITH AN AFFINE POLICY
A. Mechanism description
Due to the reasons mentioned in Section II-D, Decentralized
Prediction Provision (DPP) is highly desired, in which every
consumer can only get access to the predictions of local
renewable output of the SR it lies in, i.e. Si = {l},∀i ∈ Il .
In this paper, we propose a DPP mechanism in Algorithm 1,
whose information flow is outlined in Fig.2 (right). Take the
consumers in SR l for example:
Step 1: (Initialization) The VPP generates the predictions
wpreil for all i∈Il given the precision set by (18), and set βl = 0
for all SR l (the intuition of βl will be explained later).
Step 2: Every consumer in Il receives a βl and local
prediction information wpreil from the VPP.
Step 3: With βl and w
pre
il , it accordingly decides its optimal
demand Ddis∗il based on (14) and (16)
3. It also reports Fil :=
Ddis∗il −wpreil /I back to the VPP.
Step 4: The VPP sums up all Fil from consumers i∈ Il and
gets the result Fl for SR l. Then it further updates βl according
to Fj from all other SR j ∈ L, j 6= l, and sends the updated βl
back to consumers in SR l. This process repeats imitatively
until convergence.
B. Decision in each iteration
For SR l, the relationship between its total demand ∑i∈Il Dil
and the market price λ in (2) can be represented as below. The
information related with other SRs are compressed in βl .
λ (Dl ,Wl)=α
(
∑
i∈Il
Dil−Wl
)
+α ∑
j 6=l, j∈L
(
∑
i∈I j
Di j−Wj
)
+β0︸ ︷︷ ︸
βl
3For the decentralized case, the optimal strategy and the demand of
consumers need be differentiated across SRs.
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Ideally βl should contain Wj for all j ∈ L, j 6= l, which
however are random and it is impossible to know their exact
value w j in advance. In Algorithm 1 we use ∑i∈I j w
pre
i j /I to
approximate w j and calculate βl . When I is large, this can be
a good approximation.
Under a decentralized scheme, a consumer i in SR l only
has prediction information about local renewable output Wl ,
which is wpreil . Its decision-making problem is
max
Dil
Ui(Dil)−DilE[λ (D,W )|W preil = wpreil ] (13)
A candidate affine policy Ddis∗il is
Ddis∗il := bˆ
l
1+ bˆ
l
2i(w
pre
il −wl),∀i ∈ Il ,∀l ∈ L (14)
Applying the law of large numbers, with many consumers
in SR l, the average of Ddis∗il ,∀i ∈ Il is approximately
Ddis∗l := bˆ
l
1+ bˆ
l
2(wl−wl),∀l ∈ L (15)
where bˆl2 = ∑i∈Il bˆ
l
2i/I. Then the optimal consumption level
of consumer i ∈ Il under given βl and precision τil is given
by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Given the updates βl ,∀l ∈ L and prediction
precision τil ,∀l ∈ L, i ∈ Il , the consumer i ∈ Il’s optimal
demand under the decentralized scheme is given by (14) with
bˆl2i =
ατil
γτl+u
,∀i ∈ Il ,
bˆl1 =
t−βl+αwl
γ+u
(16)
where γ = Iα .
It follows that the consumer i ∈ Il’s expected net utility is
E[pii] := E[
1
2
u(Ddis∗il )
2]
=
1
2
u
[
(
t−βl+αwl
γ+u
)2+
α2σ2Wlτil
(γτl+u)2
]
(17)
The proof of Proposition 3 is similar to that of Proposition
1 and so is omitted here. Different from the optimal decision
under centralized scheme, here the influence of renewable
uncertainties in other SRs is reflected in the “constant” term
bˆl1. Meanwhile, we can figure out that the optimal prediction
precision of SR l is independent of the information from other
SRs. This is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. With decentralized predictions, the optimal
prediction precision for the SR l is
τdis∗l = max
(
0,
σ2Wl −
√
2mu/I/α
σ2Wl +
√
2mI/u
)
,∀l ∈ L (18)
The proof of Proposition 4 follows the same line of the
proof of Proposition 2. With the above analysis, we close this
subsection with several remarks, indicating the benefits of our
decentralized scheme:
1) The optimal value of τdis∗l is independent of βl and
remains unchanged in each iteration. This allows each SR
to determine its optimal prediction precision individually and
beforehand, without communicating with the others.
2) The proposed decentralized scheme is in accord with the
centralized scheme in two extreme cases:
• When m = 0, improving prediction technique doesn’t
incur any cost. At this time, τcen∗l = τ
dis∗
l = 1, which
means the more accurate the better.
• When m is sufficiently large, improving prediction pre-
cision is so costly such that consumers choose not to
improve prediction techniques, i.e., τcen∗l = 0 or τ
dis∗
l = 0.
C. Convergence
It has been shown in Proposition 4 that the optimal pre-
diction precision can be determined individually by each
SR. However, the optimal demand level still depends on the
information from other SRs. In this subsection, a condition
under which the DPP algorithm (Algorithm 1) converges
is given. The optimal decision at convergence point is also
revealed. Consider the following inequality:
C1: (L−2)Iα < u.
Proposition 5. When C1 holds and when every consumer in
every SR l chooses the optimal prediction precision τdis∗l as
in (18), the average demand of every SR l ∈ L in the DPP
algorithm converges to
Dˆdis∗l =
t−β0+α
L
∑
j=1
w j
ζ +u
+
α(τdis∗l −1)
γτdis∗l +u
(wl−wl)
+
γ+u
ζ +u
L
∑
j=1
α
γτdis∗j +u
(w j−w j) (19)
The proof of Proposition 5 can be found in Appendix D.
It indicates that even if the consumer in SR l has no access
to the predictions of the renewable outputs from other SRs,
its optimal decision, however, converges to a quantity that
contains such information, if Condition C1 holds.
Fig. 3. Economic intuition behind Condition C1.
Remark: We try to give an economic interpretation of
Condition C1: Recall that equation (2) shows the relationship
of electricity price λ and total demand ∑Ll=1∑i∈Il Di. A higher
λ is associated with more demand, which in other words
means the market is more willing to supply. Equation (2) is
actually the supply function of the electricity market and its
price-to-quantity sensitivity for each consumer is related to L,
I and α . In equation (7), the demand D∗i decreases with the
price E[λ (D,W )|Ai], which can be interpreted as the demand
function of an individual consumer with the absolute value of
the slope equals to u. Condition C1 means that the absolute
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value of the slope of the supply curve is less than the absolute
value of the slope of the demand curve. When C1 holds,
the deviations of price and quantity are compressed after the
market reactions. A illustrative diagram is given in Fig.3 and
similar phenomenon can be found in [24], which is also known
as cobweb model in economics.
D. Comparison: centralized v.s. decentralized
Given the optimal decisions of consumers with both central-
ized and decentralized predictions, in this section, we compare
the gap between them to theoretically validate the effectiveness
of the DPP algorithm.
When Assumptions A1-A2 and Condition C1 hold, we are
able to compute the optimal average demand for each SR, with
both centralized and decentralized predictions. Denote them by
Dcen∗l (given by (12)) and Dˆ
dis∗
l (given by (19)), respectively.
Theorem 1. For any l ∈ L, the expectation
E[Dcen∗l − Dˆdis∗l ] = 0 (20)
and the variance D(Dcen∗l − Dˆdis∗l ) is bounded.
The proof of Theorem 1 is postponed to Appendix E.
Theorem 1 implies that for each SR l, the DPP algorithm
can achieve the same expected average demand level as when
centralized predictions are available. The variance of the gap
between Dcen∗l and Dˆ
dis∗
l is bounded, implying that the devi-
ation from the optimal demand with centralized predictions
incurred by information loss would likely be well controlled.
With above, by providing a more practical local prediction
paradigm, the DPP algorithm allows each SR to operate in a
decentralized manner, while achieving an acceptable overall
market performance.
V. SIMULATION
In this section, numerical experiments are conducted to sup-
port the theoretical results and provide some insights. First, a
simple case with 3 subregions is tested, i.e., L= 3. The param-
eters for each SR are: w1 = 300 kWh, w2 = 500 kWh, w3 = 400
kWh, and σ2W1 = 400 (kWh)
2, σ2W2 = 3000 (kWh)
2, σ2W3 =
1600 (kWh)2. We choose m = 5 $(kWh)2, u = 8 $/(kWh)2,
t = 80 $/(kWh), α = 0.003 $/(kWh)2 and β0 = 0.03 $/(kWh).
First, the performance of the DPP algorithm with different
numbers of consumers is investigated. We test the cases with
I = 90, I = 300, I = 900, and I = 3000, and the results are
shown in Fig. 4.(a)-(d), respectively. Note that Condition C1
holds for cases (a)-(c), and thus, the DPP algorithm converges
as shown in the figure. However, the DPP algorithm fails to
converge for case (d) because (L−2)Iα = 9> 8= u. This veri-
fies that the proposed algorithm is guaranteed to converge with
a moderate number of consumers. Additionally, we observe
that with more consumers, the gap between centralized and
DPP algorithms at the equilibrium point is narrower, while the
convergence becomes slower with severer oscillation (which
can also be verified in the proof of Proposition 5, by noticing
that the spectral radius of H is monotonically increasing with
consumer number I), revealing a possible trade-off between
transient and steady-state performance of DPP.
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Fig. 4. Performance of the DPP algorithm. When Condition C1 holds, the
average demand converges; otherwise it does not.
We further analyze the impact of consumer number I and
uncertainty level σ2Wl on the gap between D
cen∗
l and Dˆ
dis∗
l .
We change I from 200 to 1400, and σ2Wl from 1 to 3.5 times
of their original values, for all l ∈ L. With these parameters
changing, the varianceD(Dcen∗l −Dˆdis∗l ) is plotted in Fig. 5.(a)-
(b), respectively. The gaps decline with the growth of either
factor, implying that the DPP algorithm can perform better
with more consumers and higher uncertainty. Even with a
small number of consumers I and low uncertainty σ2Wl ,∀l ∈L,
the gaps are still small.
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Fig. 5. Impact of the number of consumers and uncertainty on the variance.
Besides the optimal consumption strategy above, we also
analyze the expected total profit, defined as the following:.
E
[
L
∑
l=1
∑
i∈Il
Ui(Di)−λ (D,W )D
]
−
L
∑
l=1
m
σ2Wl
τl
1− τl
We calculate the total profit of the centralized method minus
that of the decentralized one, and show the mean and vari-
ance of this difference in Fig. 6, with a varying number of
consumers I and uncertainty level σ2Wl .
We observe that the expected total profit of the centralized
method does not necessarily exceed that of the decentralized
one. We briefly discuss our conjecture about the reason, while
a formal analysis is left for future work. Under the proposed
settings, two main factors that may influence the total profit are
interest conflicts among consumers (which have been widely
investigated in the literature based on the Cournot model) and
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Fig. 6. Influence of the number of consumers and uncertainty on the profit.
renewable uncertainty. When consumers do not know the exact
value of market price and hence decide their strategies by
predictions, the associated ambiguity may offset the negative
impact of interest conflicts. If this happens, the expected total
profit of the decentralized method may surpass that of the
centralized one. As I increases, the impact of interest conflicts
starts to dominate, making the centralized method steadily
outperform the decentralzied one. From another perspective, as
σ2Wl increases, the gap between centralized and decentralized
methods wanders near zero since uncertainty dominates and
diminishes the effect of interest conflicts.
TABLE I
TIME AND NUMBER OF ITERATIONS UNDER DIFFERENT L
L 3 9 15 21 27 33
Time (s) 0.078 0.157 0.231 0.259 0.603 0.428
Iterations 3 6 9 10 17 71
To show the practicability of the proposed algorithm, we
test the cases with more subregions by letting L equal to 3, 9,
15, 21, 27, and 33, respectively. The computational time and
number of iterations needed to converge are shown in TABLE
I. Though both time and iterations grow with the scale of the
test system, they are all moderate and acceptable.
VI. CONCLUSION
Facing increasing penetration of distributed renewables, a
decentralized prediction provision (DPP) algorithm is pre-
sented in this paper, enabling consumers to decide their
consumption levels with local predictions. Several desirable
properties of the proposed algorithm have been proved, in-
cluding its convergence guarantee and statistical performance
compared to the centralized framework. Future research di-
rections include quantifying the gap of total profit under
centralized and decentralized schemes and generalizing the
proposed algorithm for VPPs with diverse facilities.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Note that {εil : i ∈ Nl} are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) and εil is independent from Wl . This implies
that E[εil |Wl = wl ] = E[εil ] = 0 and cov(εil ,Wl) = 0 for each
subregion l ∈L and consumer i∈Nl . Therefore, E[W preil |Wl =
wl ] = wl . We have:
wl =E[Wl ] =E[E[Wl |W preil ]] = A1i,l+A2i,lwl (A.1)
and with cov(εil ,Wl) = 0, it gives
σ2Wl = cov(Wl ,W
pre
il )
= cov(W preil ,E[Wl |W preil ])
= cov(W preil ,A1i,l+A2i,lW
pre
il )
= A2i,l(σ2Wl +σ
2
εil ). (A.2)
With the above two conditions, we obtain
A2i,l =
σ2Wl
σ2Wl +σ
2
εil
, A1i,l = (1−A2i,l)wl . (A.3)
B. Proof of Proposition 1
Substitute (8) into the optimal condition (7), we get
t−u(b1+
L
∑
l=1
bl2i(w
pre
il −wl))
= E[ζ (b1+
L
∑
l=1
bl2(Wl−wl))−α
L
∑
l=1
Wl+β0|Ai]
= E[ζ (b1−
L
∑
l=1
bl2w¯l)+β0+
L
∑
l=1
(ζbl2−α)Wl |Ai]
= ζ (b1−
L
∑
l=1
bl2wl)+β0+
L
∑
l=1
(ζbl2−α)(1− τil)wl
+
L
∑
l=1
(ζbl2−α)τilwpreil . (B.1)
This must hold for all wpreil , whence
t−u(b1−
L
∑
l=1
bl2iwl) = ζ (b1−
L
∑
l=1
bl2wl)+β0
+
L
∑
l=1
(ζbl2−α)(1− τil)wl ,
and −ubl2i = (ζbl2−α)τil ,∀l ∈ L. (B.2)
With above equations, we can get the values of b1 and
bl2i,∀l ∈ L, i ∈Nl :
bl2i =
ατil
ζτl+u
,∀l ∈ L, i ∈Nl , b1 = t−β0+∑l αwlζ +u . (B.3)
C. Proof of Proposition 2
For the centralized prediction scheme, the prediction cost for
each consumer i ∈ I is ∑l∈L hl(τil) with mˇ= m/(IL). Then
∂
(
E[pii]−
L
∑
l=1
hl
)
∂τil
=
uα2σ2Wl
2(ζτl+u)2
− m
ILσ2Wl
1
(1− τil)2 . (C.1)
Because of symmetry, τil = τl ,∀i ∈ Nl = I. Therefore, the
optimal prediction precision is
τcen∗l = max
(
0,
σ2Wl −
√
2mu/(IL)/α
σ2Wl +
√
2mIL/u
)
,∀l ∈ L. (C.2)
D. Proof of Proposition 5
Denote by Dk+1l the average of D
k+1
il ,∀i ∈ Il . Recall that
Fk+1l ≈ IDk+1l −wl
=
t−β kl +αwl
α+u/I
+
ατdis∗l
ατdis∗l +u/I
(wl−wl)−wl
and β kl = β0+α∑ j 6=l F
k
j ,∀l ∈ L. Thus, we have
Fk+11
...
Fk+1L
= H

Fk1
...
FkL
+h (D.1)
where
H =

0 − γγ+u · · · − γγ+u
− γγ+u 0 · · · − γγ+u
...
...
. . .
...
− γγ+u − γγ+u · · · 0

h =

t−β0+αw1
α+u/I +
ατdis∗1
ατdis∗1 +u/I
(w1−w1)−w1
...
t−β0+αwL
α+u/I +
ατdis∗L
ατdis∗L +u/I
(wL−wL)−wL
 . (D.2)
Since the eigenvalues of H are γγ+u and
γ(1−L)
γ+u . When C1
holds, the spectral radius of H is less than 1, so the DPP
algorithm converges. Let Fk+1l = F
k
l = F
∗
l and Dˆ
dis∗
l = (F
∗
l +
wl)/I. It is easy to obtain the value of Dˆdis∗l .
E. Proof of Theorem 1
The expectation E[Dcen∗l − Dˆdis∗l ] = 0 by definition. It re-
mains to prove that the variance is bounded. First, E[Dcen∗l −
Dˆdis∗l ] = 0 implies D(D
cen∗
l − Dˆdis∗l ) = E[(Dˆdis∗l − Dcen∗l )2].
Continuing from this, the expectation E[(Dˆdis∗l −Dcen∗l )2] is
∑
j∈L, j 6=l
(
γ+u
ζ +u
α
γτdis∗j +u
− ατ
cen∗
j
ζτcen∗j +u
)2
σ2W j︸ ︷︷ ︸
(E.1.a)
+
(
γ−ζ
ζ +u
α
γτdis∗l +u
+
ατdis∗l
γτdis∗l +u
− ατ
cen∗
l
ζτcen∗l +u
)2
σ2Wl︸ ︷︷ ︸
(E.1.b)
. (E.1)
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The term (E.1.a) equals to(
γ+u
ζ +u
α
u
)2
σ2W j , when 0≤ σ2W j < τ¯1(
αγσ2W j +u
√
2mu
IL
)2
(ζ +u)2u2σ2W j
, when σ2W j ∈ [τ¯1, τ¯2)
(γ+ u√
L
)2
(ζ +u)2
2m
Iuσ2W j
, when σ2W j ≥ τ¯2.
Furthermore, the term (E.1.b) equals to(
γ−ζ
ζ +u
α
u
)2
σ2Wl , when 0≤ σ2Wl < τ¯1(
α(γ−ζ −u)σ2Wl +u
√
2mu
IL
)2
(ζ +u)2u2σ2Wl
, when σ2Wl ∈ [τ¯1, τ¯2)
[γ−ζ +u(√1/L−1)]2
(ζ +u)2
2m
Iuσ2Wl
, when σ2Wl ≥ τ¯2
where τ¯1 :=
√
2mu/(IL)/α , and τ¯2 :=
√
2mu/(I)/α .
For any σW j in the first and second categories, the bounded-
ness of σ2W j implies the boundedness of the corresponding term
in (E.1). For any σW j in the third category, the corresponding
term in (E.1) decreases with increasing σW j and is therefore
also bounded. Thus, the variance D(Dcen∗l −Dˆdis∗l ) is bounded.
